Svepande domstolsbeslut försvagar integritetsskydd

Jag har hittat ännu ett dokument från FN-systemet som rör övervakning av telekommunikation, det är författat 28 december 2009 av Martin Scheinin, FNs särskilda rapportör för skydd av mänskliga rättigheter och fundamentala friheter i kampen mot terrorism.

Some States have taken measures to address the erosion of safeguards. In the United States, after a number of court cases and because of the reauthorization requirements under the USA Patriot Act, more opportunities for judicial review have been reintroduced. Changes to the communications surveillance practices in Sweden and the United States have reintroduced some limited safeguards in the form of judicial warrants. (stycke 52)

Följande passage som inte specifikt rör Sverige, tar upp de farhågor som även jag delar angående svepande domstolsbeslut ("broad subpoenas" alternativt "judicial warrants").

Whereas data protection law should protect information collected for one purpose being used for another, national security and law enforcement policies are generally exempted from these restrictions. This is done through secrecy provisions in lawful access notices, broad subpoenas and exemption certificates such as national security certificates, which exempt a specific database from adhering to privacy laws. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that this limits the effectiveness of necessary safeguards against abuse. (stycke 50)

På vanlig svenska, svepande domstolsbeslut som kan omfatta tusentals, och inte enstaka, individer försvagar det ingetritetsskydd som politiker försöker skapa genom lagstiftning. Likaså är rapportörens observationer och rekommendation om datamining intressanta.

Freedom of movement can also be substantially affected by surveillance. ...A mosaic of data assembled from multiple databases may cause data-mining algorithms to identify innocent people as threats. If persons are prohibited from leaving a country, the State must provide information on the reasons requiring the restriction on freedom of movement. Otherwise, the State is likely to violate article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (stycke 37)

Individuals may be subject to inappropriate surveillance, where profiles are developed through data mining, and erroneous judgements, without any prior notification of the practice. Furthermore, the lack of clear and appropriate limitations to surveillance policies makes it difficult to prove that these powers are not used in arbitrary and indiscriminate manners. (stycke 54)

Given the inherent dangers of data mining, the Special Rapporteur recommends that any information-based counter-terrorism programme should be subjected to robust and independent oversight. The Special Rapporteur also recommends against the development and use of data-mining techniques for counterterrorism purposes. (stycke 70)