ICC's lack of jurisdiction over Russia's aggression on Ukraine and the establishment of a special tribunal

Worthy reminder on ICC lack of jurisdiction over Russia's aggression on Ukraine. When the inclusion of the crime of aggression into the jurisdiction of the ICC was debated and agreed upon 2010 in Kampala some states did not want to accept the jurisdiction at all over its citizens: China, the U.S. and Russia. Even states that were and are parties to the ICC statute such as France and UK opposed proposals that would extend the ICCs jurisdiction for the crime of aggression beyond the small groups of states that ratified the changes. This means that France and UK dont even accept the ICC s jurisdiction for the crime if committed by their nationals. If one would accept the position of France and UK, the ICC would only have jurisdiction if countries such as Iceland, Germany, Sweden, San Marino or Switzerland would start a war against each other. Now France (and other states) wants to create a special tribunal for the crime of aggression in relation to Russia. I dont have a major problem that Sweden - which has accepted the jurisdiction of the court over the crime of aggression - is pushing for this, but France? Is it realistic that the West can convince a substantial part of the rest of the world to vote in the UN general assembly to establish a special tribunal for the crime of aggression?

I do think that Russia's leaders - if they somehow are brought from power - should be held accountable for the crime of aggression, the better option would be through a hybrid tribunal supported by the EU and/or the CoE grounded in Ukrainian law and Ukrainian jurisdiction which already prohibits the crime of aggression. Don't go the UN general assembly route, I dont think there will be support enough. Last time there was a vote in UN General Assembly on the Russo-Ukrainian war (concerning damages to be paid by Russia) the voting numbers were 94 for, 14 against and 73 abstentions. I think voting numbers would get worse and thus also the legitimacy of such a court would diminish if there is a vote on a special tribunal for aggression, and I have not started to discuss the problems with immunity.

The "no case to answer" standard and the process of fact-finding in the Gbagbo case

Trial Chamber I issued yesterday its reasons for the oral decision of 15 January 2019 in the Gbagbo case. The decision of the majority is quite short, instead one needs to read the reasons of Judge Geoffrey Henderson and the opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser to understand the majority.

The introduction of the "no case to answer" procedure at the ICC
I have had some concern about the introduction of the "no case to answer" procedure at the ICC since such a procedure is neither provided for in the Rome Statute nor in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. I have previously held the same view as Burrow (2010 in Khan et al., p. 691) that the confirmation of charges proceedings could fulfil the same purpose, namely to ensure that only cases in which the prosecution’s case is sufficiently strong to commit the person to trial, are confirmed (Klamberg, 2013, p. 147). The "no case to answer" procedure does not fit well with the other potential features of the ICC procedural framework as adopted in some of the cases, as illustrated by the Gbagbo case. Judge Henderson comments in the following way about the fact that the Trial Chamber has not made any admissibility rulings.

this Trial Chamber did not make any admissibility rulings. This means that there has been absolutely no filter on what the parties were able to submit into the case record. This has resulted in the case record being flooded with documents of doubtful authenticity as well as documents containing significant anonymous hearsay. This sits uncomfortably with the traditional Adversarial/Common Law no-case to answer test, which instructs Chambers to consider the Prosecutor’s evidence at its highest. (para. 4)

However, I will not devote the rest of this blog post arguing that it was wrong to introduce the "no case to answer" procedure at the ICC. The Appeals Chamber has in Ntaganda confirmed, that trial chambers may decide to conduct a "no case to answer" procedure on the basis of their power to rule on relevant matters pursuant to article 64(6)(f) of the Statute and rule 134(3) of the Rules (Judgement 5 september 2017, para. 44). Thus, it is procedure available at the ICC and none of the parties - not even the prosecution - appear to argue that the availability of the procedure is wrong as such. However, the mere availability of the procedure may have consequences for other parts of the ICC procedural framework, including for the confirmation of charges proceedings and admission of evidence. The different components of the systems are interrelated and there are some limits on the suitability of different procedural combinations.

The "no case to answer" standard and the process of fact-finding
Instead I will focus on the "no case to answer" standard in the Gbagbo case. It would however  restrict this discussion to be only about a "standard" since my view is that evidentiary standards also have consequences for the method of evaluating evidence, it would therefore also be suitable to describe as a process of fact-finding. In other words, how did Judge Henderson go about when deciding to end the case against Mr Laurent Gbagbo and Mr Charles Blé Goudé?

Inventory of potential components or steps to take when evaluating evidence
Before we assess how Judge Henderson reasoned we could make an inventory of potential components or steps to take when evaluating evidence. I have previously (Klamberg, 2013 and Klamberg, 2015) discussed different components or steps to take in relation to evaluating evidence. I have also argued that this depends on the stage of the proceedings. This begs the question, which steps has Judge Henderson taken? In order to make the final determination of guilt all steps need to be taken at some stage of the proceedings, including:

1. The judge must ascertain what elements and facts in issue need to be established
2. The evidence has to be structured with, applying the following components and questions.
i) Is the evidence relevant in order to prove the charge? If the proposition is deconstructed into parts, one may exclude irrelevant circumstances.
ii) What is the bearing of the evidence, is it a part of the evidence for the prosecution or for the defence?
iii) What kind of evidence has been submitted? Is it “direct” or “circumstantial” evidence?
Yvonne McDermott has similarly pointed to the utility of Wigmorean Analysis (McDermott, 2015).
3. The probative value and weight relevant for each fact in issue has to be determined. Reliability and credibility are relevant factors when assessing probabative value.
4. If several evidential facts, i.e. several pieces of evidence (for example witness testimony, documents, etc), are relevant to a fact in issue, the Court has to weigh the pieces against each other. I try to avoid the phrase "holistic evaluation of evidence", but if the phrase is ever to be used it is in this context when weighing evidence pieces of evidence against each other in order to asses a specific fact in issue. At this stage of evaluating evidence, statistical methods could be used with caution. Frequency-type probability is useful for assessing DNA evidence and similar types of evidence, but arguably not for assessing the entire body of evidence in a case. Other probability methods could be used with caution - as thumb rules only - when assessing corroborative and circumstantial evidence.
5. When the probative value of the evidence has been determined the court must be satisfied that it is strong enough to meet the standard of proof. Three factors have to be considered before a final determination is made as to whether the standard has been satisfied.
i) The court must first weigh the evidence in favour or against the proposition.
ii) Second, the requirement on the standard for an adequate investigation must be satisfied. If the standard for an adequate investigation has not been satisfied and the evidence is not robust, the judges have the options to a) do nothing during the trial and wait until the final deliberations to acquit the accused; b) dismiss the case through a summary judgment or c) order the production of more evidence.
iii) Third, as part of evaluating whether the weight of the evidence meet the standard of proof, the judges should test and eliminate alternative hypotheses which could give a different reasonable explanation to the charges made by the prosecution.

I am going to read Judge Henderson's reasons with these steps in mind.

The "no case to answer" standard and the process of fact-finding at the ad hoc tribunals
Let us first consider the procedure at the ad hoc tribunals. The original ICTY rules of procedure and evidence had no specific rule concerning motions to dismiss the prosecution case through a summary judgment. In both the Tadić case and the Delalić et al. case motions of no-case-to-answer were filed. In both cases the Trial Chambers examined the motions, which shows the Chambers’ concern for the rights of the accused (Tadić, ICTY T. Ch., 13 September 1996 and Delalić et al.  ICTY T. Ch., 18 March 1998). The Trial Chamber rejected the motions on their merits. However, they could also have dismissed the motions on the ground that, at the time, there was no rule of no-case-to-answer and the accused was entitled to be presumed innocent. As a consequence of these decisions Rule 98 bis was adopted allowing for filing of motions of acquittal. The rule went even further, conferring on the Trial Chamber at the close of the prosecutor’s case the proprio motu power to enter a judgment of acquittal on any count if there is no evidence capable of supporting a conviction. In Jelisić the Appeals Chamber set the standard with regard to the test to be applied under rule 98 bis, namely whether the “evidence, if believed, is insufficient for any reasonable trier of fact to find that guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.” The test is not whether the trier would in fact arrive at a conviction beyond reasonable doubt on the prosecution evidence (if accepted) but whether it could (Jelisić, ICTY A. Ch., 5 July 2001, para. 37).

The "no case to answer" standard and the process of fact-finding in Ruto and Sang
ICC Trial Chamber V(A) adopted a similar approach in Ruto and Sang stating that "the test to be applied in determining a ‘no case to answer’ motion […] is whether there is evidence on which a reasonable Trial Chamber could convict", adding that "the test to be applied in determining a ‘no case to answer’ motion […] is whether there is evidence on which a reasonable Trial Chamber could convict" (Ruto and Sang, Decision No. 5 on the Conduct of Trial Proceedings (Principles and Procedure on ‘No Case to Answer’ Motions), 3 June 2014, ICC-01/09-01/11-1334, para. 32.).

The "no case to answer" standard and the process of fact-finding in Gbabgo 
Kevin Jon Heller hoped in January 2019 to see the standard of proof expressed in the phrase “evidence (if accepted) upon which a reasonable tribunal of fact could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused” in the forthcoming decision.

The majority decided not to follow Ruto and Sang (Henderson, paras. 1-8; Cuno Tarfusser, para. 67)

Considering the approach to admissibility taken in the Gbabgo case Judge Henderson stated that "[i]t cannot be assumed ... that all the evidence on the record has at least some minimal probative value" (para. 5) and decided to adopt a different approach by engaging in "a full review of the evidence submitted and relied upon by the Prosecutor" (para. 8). What standard of evidence does that entail? Judge Henderson explains that "a decision that there is no case to answer is not a formal judgment of acquittal on the basis of the application of the beyond reasonable doubt standard in accordance with article 74 of the Statute" (para. 17) and does not use that phrase in any other instance of his reasons. Does that mean that Kevin Jon Heller should be disappointed? What is the standard used by Judge Henderson?

My reading is that of Judge Henderson reasons is that he takes all the five steps that I have described above in evaluating the evidence. I would like to highlight some of the steps taken.

1. Judge Henderson explains in para. 91 and parts IV-VI which elements and facts in issue that need to be established. The evidence submitted by the Prosecution is structured in the manner understood by the Judges and an assessment is made of the probative value and weight relevant for each fact.

2. Above I use the phrase "standard for an adequate investigation" and robustness which relates to question whether the prosecutor has gathered evidence that covered all the facts in issue, a matter of quantity. Judge Henderson does not use these word but appears to question the investigation, as illustrated in the following phrase.

As will be noted several times throughout this opinion, although the available evidence is voluminous, a lot of essential information is still missing. Whether this is due to the information being unavailable to the Prosecutor or to the fact that the Prosecutor did not look (hard enough) for it is not for me to say." (para. 5)

He also finds the available evidence far from complete (para. 67).

3. In part IX of the reasons Judge Henderson entertains as an option to ending the case, the idea of recharacterising the charged facts and circumstances under regulation 55. This would under subregulation 3(b) allow the parties to call a new witness or to present other evidence. This option is dismissed since none of the parties has made a serious effort to raise the question of the existence of an armed conflict during the period relevant to the charges.

4. Judge Henderson describes in part III the prosecutor's case theory as a "narrative", he criticises the Prosecutor's "one-sided version of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire" (para. 66), presents an alternative to the Prosecutor's case theory of the President being in control (para. 67) and points to "alternative reading" of the evidence (para. 1171).  Judge Henderson describes how the Prosecutor has failed to prove that "the combined effect of all her evidence is greater than the sum of the individual (non-incriminating) parts" (para. 88).

Judge Cuno Tarfusser appears to have a similar approach when he states the following.

the evidence on the record not only fails to convince me that any of the charged incidents did indeed occur pursuant to the Prosecutor’s narrative, but is rather suitable to point to one or more alternative readings which are equally, if not more, plausible. (para. 75)

In other words, the Prosecutor has failed in eliminating all reasonable, alternative explanations to the Prosecutor's case theory. Judge Cuno Tarfusser's statement suggests that the Prosecutor even has failed to reach the balance of probabilities standard.

In conclusion, the Judge Henderson has taken steps in relation to "no case to answer" motion which are very close or almost identical to a finding under the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard. Is an appeal by the Prosecution warranted, has the trial chamber used the wrong evidentiary standard? My reading of the Judge Henderson's reasons is that it is not only a blow against the Prosecution, is also a rebuffal of the confirmation of charges decision. Evidence may have been missing already with a lower standard, as suggested by the dissenting opinion of Pre-Trial Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert.

Making the procedural framework coherent and efficient
As argued above, the mere availability of the "no case to answer "procedure may have consequences for other parts of the ICC procedural framework, including for the confirmation of charges proceedings and admission of evidence. I am not sure if the ICC has got their approach to admissibility of evidence right, not even if one has a civil law approach. In para. 20 of Judge Henderson's reasons one may read that "the Chamber by majority decided that decisions on the admissibility and relevance of the evidence submitted by a party ... will be deferred to the final judgment". This should be compared with Judge Cuno Tarfusser who argues that the evidence should have been seriously filtered in  order to shape the trial (para. 20). On the other hand he argues that "to the so-called admissibility ruling system, and [his] preference for a system whereby the evidence as a whole is considered within the context of the final determinations of the trial" (para. 69). I would argue that it is fine to asses credibility and reliability in the final judgement, but even in continental European systems one may find mechanisms whereby judges consider relevance before the evidence is allowed to be presented and be part of the submitted evidence.

Has the majority in the Bemba case treated circumstantial evidence with the logics that apply to hearsay evidence?

The Appeal Judgement in the Bemba case has resulted in a debate on several issues, including evaluation of evidence. I would like to highlight two paragraphs in the separate opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison.

11. We are also concerned about the fact that the Trial Chamber relied on a large amount of circumstantial evidence in relation to a number of key findings. Again, the Trial Chamber stated the correct principle that circumstantial evidence can only lead to findings beyond a reasonable doubt when the proposed inference is the only plausible one, but has often failed to adhere to this principle in its actual analysis.  

12. For example, in paragraphs 676 to 684, the Conviction Decision lists eight circumstantial factors that it considered cumulatively proved the existence of a policy to attack a civilian population. We are far from persuaded that there was sufficient evidence to support the eight ‘factors’ that were relied upon. In this regard, it is sometimes argued that only the material facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and that it is unnecessary to establish subsidiary facts to the same standard.7 While this is legally correct, it does not mean that the quality of the evidence for subsidiary facts is irrelevant from an evidentiary point of view. This is especially true in relation to circumstantial evidence. By definition, drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence only adds uncertainty. Therefore, if the factual basis of the circumstantial evidence is weak, the inferences drawn from it will be even weaker.

I have a problem especially with the last sentence which is arguably wrong: "if the factual basis of the circumstantial evidence is weak, the inferences drawn from it will be even weaker."

To the contrary, even if separate pieces of evidence are too weak by themselves to prove guilt, the combined evidentiary value will be stronger than any of the individual pieces if the pieces of evidence are independent and seek to prove the same fact in issue. These logics apply to circumstantial evidence which is a form of concurrent (corroborative) evidence. The opposite logics apply to successive (chain) evidence, all pieces of evidence in a chain that are less than certain will have the result that the combined inference will be even weaker. Hearsay is an example of this. From the paragraph above it appears as the judges in the majority erroneously have applied the logics of successive evidence when evaluating circumstantial evidence (concurrent evidence). In other words, has the majority in the Bemba case treated circumstantial evidence with the logics that apply to hearsay evidence?

I have written about this in my book Evidence in International Criminal Trials (2013), pages 177-179 and more recently in the article The Alternative Hypothesis Approach, Robustness and International Criminal Justice (2015). Let us compare successive (chain) evidence and concurrent (corroborative) evidence while leaving counterevidence aside.

First, successive (chain) evidence concerns evidentiary facts that each are links in a chain. The links all have a probative value that is less than certain, which will have the result that the combined evidentiary weight can never be higher than the evidentiary value of the weakest link. The rule of thumb, or cautionary advice, is that successive evidence is often overestimated because the focus of the evaluation of evidence tends to be towards the last link of the chain neglecting the previous links. This is the reason why the evidentiary value of hearsay evidence (which is a form of successive evidence) tends to be weaker than direct evidence. International judges appear to be aware of this danger. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)Appeals Chamber has in Aleksovski and Kordic and Cerkez listed indicia of reliability for hearsay evidence where of one indicia is whether it is ‘first-hand or removed’. This approach has been repeated at the ICTY and at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and International Criminal Court (ICC); case law suggests that hearsay evidence normally should be afforded less probative value or weight.

Secondly, counterevidence…  

Thirdly, concurrent (corroborative) evidence concerns two or more independent pieces of evidence that concurs and separately has a probative value supporting the fact in issue. An example would be two witnesses that observe the same event independently of each other. The probative value in such cases may be higher than the highest probative value of any of the separate pieces of evidence, which [at a first glance] may appear illogical. The rule of thumb is thus that in cases of concurrent evidence the weight is, according to Ekelöf, often higher than what is normally expected. With a similar logic, judges at the ICTR and ICC have declared that they attach higher probative value to those parts of a testimony which may be corroborated;  

Klamberg, The Alternative Hypothesis Approach, Robustness and International Criminal Justice (2015), pages 540-541

I dont have a problem with what  Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison write about [alternative] plausible explanations in para. 14, it fits very well with my take on evaluating evidence. It is just another part in the process.

Osannolikt att Blair ställs inför internationell domstol

Jag har blivit intervjuad i SvD om Chilcot-rapporten (utredning om Storbritanniens beslut att stödja och delta i den USA-ledda invasionen av Irak 2003.

Sudans president kan stoppas

Idag blev jag intervjuad om Sydafrikas hantering av arresteringsordern mot Bashir under rubriken "Sudans president kan stoppas".

Launch of CLICC in the Hague

Here is a report from the conference "Reconciliation v. Accountability: Balancing Interests of Peace and Justice", The Hague, The Peace Palace, the headquarters of the International Court of Justice, 29 May 2015. At the conference I had presentation where the Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court (CLICC) was launched. You may watch my presentation at 1.54 below.

Some comments on the Katanga judgment and Van den Wyngaert's dissenting opinion

I have started to review the Katanga judgment and the dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert. Considering the field of my research (evidence) I specifically sought for information revealing how the Judges understand the standard beyond reasonable doubt.

Due to my poor French I am not sure on the view of the majority. I belive the relevant passage is paras. 68-70.

Fardeau de la preuve

68. Aux termes de l’article 66 du Statut, l’accusé est présumé innocent jusqu’à ce que le Procureur ait prouvé sa culpabilité. Pour qu’il soit déclaré coupable, il faut que chacun des éléments de l’infraction reprochée ait été établi « au - delà de tout doute raisonnable » .

69. La Chambre précise que le principe d’établissement de la preuve « au - delà de tout doute raisonnable » doit être appliqué s’il s’agit d’établir l’existence d’un élément du crime ou du mode de responsabilité retenu à l’encontre de l’accusé, ou encore, s ’il s’agit d’établir l’existence d’un fait indispensable pour entrer en voie de condamnation.

70. Pour la Chambre, le fait qu’une allégation ne soit, selon elle, pas prouvée au - delà de tout doute raisonnable n’implique pas pour autant qu’elle mette en cause l’ existence même du fait allégué. Cela signifie seulement qu’elle estime, au vu du standard de preuve, ne pas disposer de suffisamment de preuves fiables pour se prononcer sur la véracité du fait ainsi allégué. Dès lors, déclarer qu’un accusé n’est pas coupa ble ne veut pas nécessairement dire que la Chambre constate son innocence. Une telle décision démontre simplement que les preuves présentées au soutien de la culpabilité ne lui ont pas permis de se forger une conviction « au - delà de tout doute raisonnable ».

I cannot see that the majority is talking about alternative narratives and the need for the Prosecutor to eliminate such alternatives. The Majority appear to state in para. 70 that even if a person is declared non-culpable that does mean that he/she is innocent, interesting.

I found this in Judge Van den Wyngaert's dissenting opinion (in English).

32. ... charges must represent a coherent description of how certain individuals are linked to certain e vents, defining what role they played in them and how they related to, and were influenced by, a particular context. Charges therefore constitute a narrative in which each fact belonging to the ‘facts and circumstances’ has a particular place.

33. ... It is crucial to note that it is insufficient to simply compare ‘stories’ in order to see to what e xtent they contain some of the same elements. It is equally important to analyse the legal significance of each fact within the framework of each narrative, because this determines how an accused would defend him or herself against the charges as formulated. It matters a great deal, in this respect, how important certain parts of the story are within each narrative. A similar fact may be a mere detail in one narrative, but constitute the linchpin of another. Accordingly, a defendant may have chosen not to devote scarce resources to such a fact because it could not be expected to have any tangible effect on the outcome of the case, whereas he or she would in all likelihood concentrate all his or her investigative efforts on that same fact if that fact wer e to perform a different function in an alternative narrative.

It is interesting that  Judge Van den Wyngaert uses the expression "alternative narrative". I write about narrative evidence theory on pp. 166-167 in my book Evidence in International Criminal Trials. Van den Wyngaert continues under the same philosophy.

145. In particular, there are countless points where I think it is beyond dispute that reasonable alternative explanations can be given to the evidence. It is uncontroversial that the Chamber can only rely on the incriminating version of events if all alternative explanations can be rejected for being unreasonable. However, the Majority only engages in this exercise selectively and often simply states that it is not convinced by the explanations offered by the Defence. With all due respect, this is not the appropriate approach. Instead, the Chamber must convincingly explain why the alternative explanation is considered to be unreasonable.

146. The Defence does not shoulder any burden of proof in this regard. Yet, this is very often the attitude taken by the Majority.  Rather, unless the Defence raises an explanation that is patently absurd, it is the Prosecutor’s task to disprove it.

Again, she uses expressions such as "alternative explanations" and that it is the the Prosecutor’s task to disprove it. This what I write in my book in relation to theories on the matter (pp. 183-186):

In essence, Cohen proposes an inductive method whereby alternative hypotheses may be graded ordinally in accordance with the factfinders conclusions as to how well each hypothesis is accounted for by the evidence; how well each hypothesis withstands attempts to eliminate it based on the evidence; and the extent to which any given hypothesis shows itself evidentially superior to the others in terms of completeness and quality of the evidence. Diesen suggests that alternative hypotheses should be tested when they are reasonable in the sense that they are not pure scepticism or speculation. More specifically, a reasonable hypothesis is 1) compatible with at least some of the facts in the case, and 2) commensurable with the indictment, i.e. the alternative hypothesis should be possible to formulate as a legal and evidential theme.... A hypothesis that raises sufficient reasonable doubt to acquit the defendant should be compatible with the defendant’s own version or with an explanation of why the defendant has not presented such an alternative in his or her testimony. ... The fact-finding process is according to Ferrajoli always guided by a working hypothesis; the formulation of the hypothesis is always done in order to reach a possible or desired validation. The Court’s evaluation of evidence requires that the process fulfil three criteria: 1) The prosecution, which carries the burden of proof, has the duty to present the facts confirming the indictment and related circumstances; 2) the defence has the right to defy the hypothesis of the indictment by using counterevidence which are compatible with an alternative hypothesis which in its turn the prosecutor must eliminate; 3) The Court may only accept the hypothesis of an indictment if it is corresponds with all the evidence and may withstand all possible counterevidence

I also make the following conclusion on the case law of the ad hoc tribunals (p. 195).

the ad hoc tribunals have adopted “the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence method” whereby alternative hypothesis are eliminated.

One may find a similar statement by the ICC Appeals Chamber, see Al-Bashir (3 February 2010, para. 33)

requiring that the existence of genocidal intent must be the only reasonable conclusion amounts to requiring the Prosecutor to disprove any other reasonable conclusions and to eliminate any reasonable doubt.

My conclusion on p. 196:

the statements in al-Bashir and Lubanga may be analysed together with previous case law from the historical tribunals and the ad hoc tribunals. The conclusion is that when judges in international criminal proceedings evaluate whether evidence meets the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, they are acting according to the approach whereby alternative hypothesis are eliminated.

Note that Judge Van den Wyngaert has an entire section in her opinion with the title "Another reasonable reading of the evidence is possible" covering 42 pages (pp. 100-142). 

Judge Van den Wyngaert also has a very interesting arguement about the scope of investigations in para. 92.

even if the investigations yield no useful new evidence whatsoever, this does not mean – even with hindsight - that they were not necessary. ... defence investigations that yield no significant result play a very important role in confirming the validity of the conviction. However, if no investigation takes place at all, there always remains the reasonable possibility that evidence might have been found that could contradict the available incriminating evidence.

Here is what I write on the matter (pp. 153-156):

the standard of an adequate investigation is a quantitative issue while the standard of proof is a qualitative issue. To elucidate what is an adequate investigation, the concept “robustness” and its theoretical underpinnings are introduced. ... Keynes distinguished between the probability of an argument and the weight of an argument. ... Strandberg has elaborated and clarified Keynes’s theory: The degree of probability depends on the relation between the pieces of evidence in favour of a proposition and the pieces of evidence against it, while the degree of weight depends on the sum of the pieces of evidence in favour of a proposition and the pieces of evidence against. Hence if new evidence is added that is unfavourable to the proposition the probability will go down but the weight will go up. For example, assume that probability is 0.85 for a given piece of evidence (h1). Subsequently evidence h2 is added and the probability of h1 and h2 combined is now 0.45. Then a third piece of evidence h3 is added which makes the probability return to 0.85. Even if the probability is the same (0.85) before and after h2 and h3 are added, the matter has become more elucidated. Keynes would state that the probability is the same before and after the two new pieces of evidence but the weight is higher. ... Keynes’s theory is interesting but his terminology may not be transposed directly to international criminal procedure because the concept “weight” has a different meaning in case law and legal scholarship. ...  Strandberg finds Keynes’s theory and terminology ambiguous and incomplete. Instead he suggests the use of other concepts such as massiveness, completeness and robustness, concepts with closely similar meaning. Other alternative concepts to Keynes’s concept of “weight of evidence” include the “resilience” or “comprehensiveness” of evidence. For the present purpose, the concept “robustness” is used when the quantity of evidence is discussed. By robust evidence is meant that additional evidence will not change the probative value. ... the standard of an adequate investigation, and thus robustness, relates to the amount of evidence that should be collected before an evaluation of evidence is possible.

Following this terminology Judge Van den Wyngaer appears to argue that the standard of an adequate investigation has not been meet, the evidence is not robust.

Presentation from side event at the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court

At a side event to the 12th Session of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court on 25 November 2013 at 13:00-15:00 in The Hague I had a presentation of my project Commentary on the Law of the ICC (CLICC). You can see my presentation below at 1h3m. The participants at the side event included some very notable persons, including ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz, ICC Registrar Herman von Hebel, Judges David Re and LIU Daqun, Professors Martin Scheinin and Charles Garraway, and Wolfgang Kaleck (ECCHR). You can read more about the side event here. This was a very important step for the CLICC project.

Intervju i DN om Afrika och ICC

DN publicerade den 11 oktober 2013 en artikel med rubriken "Afrikanska ledare utmanar ICC" där jag är intervjuad.

Åtalet mot medåtalad till Kenyatta har fallit samman

Ett flertal medier rapporterar om att Kenyatta vunnit presidentvalet i Kenya och frågor ställs huruvida han kan vara president samtidigt som han är åtalad vid internationella brottmålsdomstolen i Haag (ICC).

William Schabas har uppmärksammat mig på en händelse i detta mål som samtliga medier tycks ha missat. Åtalet mot Kenyattas medåtalade Muthuara har fallit samman. Vad har hänt? Den 23 january 2012 fastställde ICCs förundersökningskammare åtalspunkterna mot Kenyatta och Muthaura. Därefter har det framkommit information som undergräver ett av vittnesmålen. Försvaret för såväl Kenyatta som Muthaura har därför begärt att förundersökningskammarens beslut ska undanröjas. Någon sådan procedur finns inte men åklagaren har samtyckt till åtalspunkterna mot Muthaura undanröjs för det fall en sådan procedur finns. Åklagaren skriver följande den 25 februari 2013 (para. 9).

The witness whose statement is at issue was essential on the issue of Mr Muthaura’s criminal responsibility and, in fact, was the only direct witness against him. Hence, the confirmation decision, if stripped of references to the witness' evidence, might not establish substantial grounds as a matter of law. The Prosecution also acknowledges that its disclosure error limited the Defence’s ability to challenge the critical witness’ testimony, which appears to have been the principal evidence relied upon by the Pre-Trial Chamber in its decision to confirm the charges against Mr Muthaura. In the particular circumstances of Mr Muthaura’s case, and given that he has elected to waive his Article 67(1)(c) right to go to trial without undue delay, the Prosecution does not oppose new confirmation proceedings with respect to him, should the Trial Chamber determine that there is a legal basis for such relief.

Givet att åklagaren har denna inställningen kan åklagaren lägga ner åtalet vilket anges i artikel 61(9) i Romstadgan, att skapa en särskild procedur som inte anges i stadgan verkar onödigt William Schabas verkar vara inne på samma spår. Åklagaren håller fast vid åtalet mot Kenyatta då åtalet vilar på fler vittnen än den som nämns ovan.

Jag tror utgången i målet mot Kenyatta står helt öppen med en brantare uppförsbacke för åklagaren än vanligt, efter att ha läst en rad inlagor från försvaret har jag sett en klasskillnad mot försvaret i andra mål. Det kan nämnas att förundersökningskammaren godkände åtalspunkterna med röstsiffrorna 2-1 så det fanns en osäkerhet redan tidigare (se sid. 156 i domare Kauls skiljaktiga mening).

Uppdatering 11 mars 2013. Chefsåklagaren Fatou Bensouda har låtit meddela att hon idag begär att åtalspunkterna mot Muthaura dras tillbaka. Pressmeddelandet har skickats ut per mail och finns på youtube (se nedan) men finns ännu ej på domstolens hemsida.

 

 

Uppdatering. Här finns åklagarens uttalande utskrivet.

Kan ICC pröva åtal för krigsförbrytelser begångna av Malis armé?

För två veckor sedan fick mina studenter i kursen internationell straffrätt skriva tenta. Frågorna rörde Mali, bl.a. huruvida brott begångna av Malis regeringsarmé kan prövas av Internationella Brottmåsdomstolen (ICC). Idag skriver Svenska Dagbladet att "Malis armé anklagas för krigsbrott", en fråga som berördes i tentan. Därför tänkte jag att det kunde vara intressant om jag la upp tentafrågorna och mina typsvar.

Question 1

In April 2012, rebel groups, some with links to al-Qaeda, took control of the large areas of the north of Mali. Mali is a state party to the ICC. On 18 July 2012, the Government of Mali referred the situation in Mali since January 2012 to the ICC. The Government of Mali requested the ICC to investigate alleged crimes perpetrated by the rebels. The situation in Mali has been assigned to Pre-Trial Chamber II.

One of the accusations of the Government of Mali is that the rebels are involved in widespread recruitment of young people, including children under the age of 15, on an enforced basis. Assume that the Prosecutor at the ICC starts an investigation against the leader of the rebel group that is involved in these activities. The Prosecutor claims that the leader has: 1) been informed, on a substantive and continuous basis, of all key aspects of the operations of the rebel group and 2) been involved in all key policy decisions of the group, including military strategy, organization, recruitment and financing. 1a) How would you as a Prosecutor formulate the charges in order to hold the rebel leader responsible, both in terms of the crime prosecuted and the mode of liability? (7,5 p)

Answer: It is the war of conscripting children. It is a non-international armed conflict which makes Rome Statute, article 8(2)(e)(vii) applicable, 5 p

Mode of liability: commission of the crime, article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, 2,5 p

Answers that have only discussed superior/command responsibility has given some, but not full, points. Some of the witnesses are very young and the Prosecution wants to prepare them in substance before giving evidence (witness proofing). The Prosecution also wants to familiarize the witnesses with courtroom procedures (witness familiarization). The defence objects to these practices.

1b) How would you as a judge rule on the issues of witness proofing and witness familiarization? (7,5 p)

Answer: Provide explanation what witness proofing and witness familarization is: 2,5 p Reference to case law, Limaj (ICTY), Karemara (ICTR), Lubanga (ICC), 2,5 p,

Arguments where you explain your position, 2,5 p please note that a decision from a pre-trial chamber (Lubanga) is not binding on other chambers, article 21(2). It is not enough with just a reference to the Lubanga case, you have to explain your view.

See page 462 in the textbook

Question 2

On 20 December 2012 the UN Security Council decided to authorize the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) which shall take all necessary measures, among other tasks, to support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations.

In January 2013 France deployed troops in the capital of Mali to provide security and French fighter jets have attacked rebels in the north of Mali.

Question 2a). Assume that a bomb from a French fighter jet hits a village townhouse resulting in a lot of civilian casualties. The French air force claims that an important rebel leader was at the site. At this point of time it is unclear how much information the French military was in possession of and what precautionary measures were taken. Assume that there are also allegations that Government forces have committed international crimes. As indicated above the Government of Mali requested the ICC to investigate alleged crimes perpetrated by the rebels. Does the ICC have jurisdiction over French and Government forces? Is it possible for the Government of Mali to limit the jurisdiction to the rebels? How would you rule on this issue as a judge? (7,5 p)

Answer: Explain the basis for jurisdiction: French soldiers/leaders are under the jurisdiction of the ICC on two possible grounds: ii) territory, article 12(2)(a), (crimes committed in Mali’s territory and Mali is a state party) ii) nationality, article 12(2)(b) (French citizens and France is a state party), 5 p

A possible answer on the second part of the question: There is no basis for Mali’s limitation to rebel forces in the Rome Statute. Otherwise the ICC could be used as a tool against the opponents of a Government. The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over potential crimes committed by Government forces and French forces. The self-referral of Mali activates the Court in relation to the situation in Mali but Mali does not have any control beyond that in relation to specific case selection. 2,5 p

Question 2b). Assume that the French authorities investigate the incident and decides not to initiate a trial against the fighter pilot and his superiors. No reasons for the closure of the investigations are given to the media or the public. Is the case admissible at the ICC? (7,5 p)

Answer: Explain the complementarity principle, reference to article 17 of the Rome Statute, discuss willingness, ability and genuiness in the investigation and purpose of the French investigation (is it shielding?), article 17, 5 p

Argue and motivate whether this specific case is admissible, noting that no reasons for the closure of the investigations are given to the media or the public, 2,5 p

Märkliga besked av Sverige om Syrien och ICC

Sverige har som enda EU-land valt att inte ställa sig bakom kravet att FNs säkerhetsråd ska hänföra situationen i Syrien till Internationella brottmålsdomstolen (ICC). När TT frågar varför ger utrikesdepartementet märkliga besked. Jag hade förväntat mig att man skulle svara att det eventuellt skulle skada fredsförhandlingar. Istället svarar utrikesministerns pressekreterare Sziga enligt TT att

EU:s utrikesministrar den 10 december nådde en gemensam linje om att alla som är ansvariga för krigsbrott i Syrien, oavsett vilka de är, ska ställas till svars på ett adekvat sätt."

Men där det schweiziska initiativet vill gå direkt till ICC fokuserar Sverige på att först pröva ansvarsutkrävande inom det syriska systemet, enligt Zsiga.

- Det är det valet som regeringen har gjort, säger han.

 Följande står i EUs beslut från den 10 december 2012.

The EU remains deeply concerned about the widespread and systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law which, according to the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, may amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes under the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court. The EU recalls that all those responsible for such crimes must be held accountable and that there should be no impunity for such violations and abuses. The EU has repeatedly stated that, if concerns about war crimes and crimes against humanity are not adequately addressed on a national level, the International Criminal Court should deal with the situation. The United Nations Security Council can refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court at any time. The EU calls on the United Nations Security Council to urgently address the situation in Syria in all aspects, including this issue.

På vanlig svenska, om Syrien inte utreder brotten på egen hand så borde ICC göra det. Eftersom konflikten ej har upphört och fortsatta överträdelser sker utan att ansvar utkrävs så borde den logiska slutsatsen vara att FNs säkerhetsråd ska hänskjuta situationen till ICC.

Det bör även påpekas att ICC styrs enligt artikel 17 i sin stadga av komplementaritetsprincipen vilket innebär att om syriska myndigheter utreder eventuella brott så är domstolen blockerad från att ta sig an situationen. Vidare anger artikel 16 att om ICC påbörjat en utredning så kan en sådan utredning avbrytas av FNs säkerhetsråd för en 12-månadersperiod om säkerhetsrådet finner så lämpligt, t.ex. för att underlätta fredsförhandlingar. Det finns en föreställning att hot om åtal vid ICC kan göra politiska ledare mindre villiga att inleda fredsförhandlingar, dvs det finns en konflikt mellan fred och rättvisa. Jag utesluter inte att det kan finnas sådana situationer men snart har konflikten i Syrien pågått två år utan att ICC haft behörighet och likväl har inga fredsförhandlingar skett.

I ett tidigare inlägg har jag förklarat varför situationen i Syrien endast kan utredas vid ICC ett beslut av FNs säkerhetsråd, läs mer här.

Intervention i Mali och utredning vid ICC

För de som är intresserade av Frankrikes (och Sveriges) insats i Mali är följande passage i resolution 2085 (2012) från den 20 december 2012 relevant.

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

/.../

Deployment of AFISMA
9. Decides to authorize the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year, which shall take all necessary measures, in compliance with applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Mali to carry out the following tasks:

(a) To contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in close coordination with other international partners involved in this process, including the European Union and other Member States;

(b) To support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations, including AQIM, MUJWA and associated extremist groups, while taking appropriate measures to reduce the impact of military action upon the civilian population;

/.../

Mali kan även utan en FN-resolution ge sitt samtycke till att andra stater stödjer regeringen, men med resolution 2085 (2012) får den franska insatsen även ett godkännande från FNs säkerhetsråd.

Mali har genom ett brev den 18 juli 2012 hänfört situation i Mali till internationella brottsmålsdomstolen (ICC). Domstolen är därmed aktiverad och den har jurisdiktion (behörighet) över alla eventuella internationella brott som begås i Mali oberoende av vem som begår dem (Malis regeringsstyrkor, rebeller och andra staters styrkor). Enligt beslut den 19 juli 2012 ansvarar förundersökningskammare II vid ICC för situationen i Mali.

ICC frikänner Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui

ICCs rättegångskammare har idag frikänt den kongolesen Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. Jag har ännu inte läst domen utan har bara tillgång till ett pressmeddelande. Rättegångskammaren har inte funnit det bevisat att Chui var befälhavare för Lendusoldaterna från Bedu-Ezekere i samband med attacken mot byn Bogoro den 24 februari 2003. Därför blev han frikänd.

Rättegångskammaren verkar inte anse bevisning håller vad avser den åtalade formen för Chuis gärningsmannaskap. Detta är särskilt intressant då rättegångskammaren skjutit upp domen avseende den medåtalade Katanga. Domen mot Katanga har skjutits upp eftersom rättegångskammaren vill pröva hans ansvar enligt ett annat gärningsmannaskap än vad som är åtalat för, ett beslut som kritiserats av professor Schabas.

En sak i pressmeddelandet påminner om Quickdebatten och huruvida Sture Bergvall ska anses vara oskyldig efter att tidigare domar undanröjts. Läs följande från pressmeddelandet:

The Chamber also emphasised that the fact of deciding that an accused is not guilty does not necessarily mean that the Chamber finds him innocent. Such a decision simply demonstrates that, given the standard of proof, the evidence presented to support his guilt has not allowed the Chamber to form a conviction “beyond reasonable doubt”.

Jag ser fram emot att läsa den fullständiga domen. I våras skickade jag min avhandling om bevisfrågor i internationell straffprocessrätt till en av domarna i målet, Christine Van den Wyngaert . Det blir intressant att se om domstolen tagit intryck.

Uppdatering. Här är domen (på franska). Jag har läst delarna som rör bevisvärdering där kammaren i princip upprepar vad förundersökningskammaren sagt i al-Bashir och rättegångskammaren i Lubanga. Det ligger i linje med vad jag skrivit i min avhandling, som trycktes före domen i Lubanga. Min franska är lite rostig men det verkar som rättegångskammaren inte bara grundat domen på den bevisning som parterna åberopat utan även bevisning som finns i målets akt,  se nedanstående passage.

47. Afin de déterminer si une allégation du Procureur a été prouvée, la Chambre n'a pas limité son analyse aux preuves qu'ont expressément visées les parties et les participants dans leurs plaidoiries. Elle a examiné, au cas par cas, si elle pouvait se fonder sur des éléments de preuve figurant au dossier et non expressément visés pour établir une allégation factuelle en tenant compte des prescriptions énoncées aux articles 64-2 et 74-2 du Statut. Elle s'est, en particulier, assurée que la Défense avait eu la possibilité de s'exprimer sur les éléments de preuve en question.

Det vore mycket anmärkningsvärt och när den engelska versionen av domen ska jag kontrollera om jag uppfattat saken rätt.

Intervju: Internationella Brottmålsdomstolen fyller tio år

Internationella Brottmålsdomstolen fyllde tio år i år. Jag intervjuas i P1 "Godmorgon, Världen!" om detta.

Lubanga dömd till 14 års fängelse för krigsbrott

Nu är jag tillbaka från semester och uppdaterar bloggen. Den 10 juli 2012 blev jag intervjuad i Sveriges Radio, Ekot om ICCs första dom, läs och lyssna här.

Några detaljer

Har börjat att läsa domen mot Lubanga och fokuserar på aspekter som är relevanta för min avhandling men som för övriga kan te sig helt ointressanta.

1. Har hittat ett uppenbart fel i domen. I stycke 110 anger domstolen att processreglementet ej innehåller krav på stödbevisning, enligt regel 63(3), det ska vara regel 63(4).

2. Domstolen anger i stycke 111 hur beviskravet "bortom rimligt tvivel" ska tillämpas i förhållande till indiciebevisning vilket bekräftar den tolkning som återfinns i min avhandling, mycket bra! Dock tråkigt att domstolen inte resonerar om hur bortom rimligt tvivel ska tillämpas i allmänhet. Kan konstatera att åklagaren i al-Bashir menar att beviskravet ska tillämpas på samma sätt för direkt bevisning och indiciebevisning (se para. 17) vilket överklagandekammaren inte kommenterar och därmed inte verkar ifrågasätta då den bifaller åklagarens överklagande.

Historisk dag: Internationella brottmålsdomstolen meddelar sin första dom

Idag är en historisk dag då internationella brottmålsdomstolen (ICC) meddelar sin första dom. Domen meddelas klockan 10.00 och kommer att sänds live via webben här. Den åtalade heter Thomas Lubanga Dyilo och är från Demokratiska Republiken Kongo (Kongo-Kinshasa, tidigare Zaire). Lubanga grundade och ledde rebellrörelsen UPC. Åtalet gäller rekrytering och användning av barnsoldater.

Jag har följt rättegången väldigt noggrant under mitt avhandlingsarbete som är på temat "Evidence in International Criminal Procedure - Confronting Legal Gaps and the Reconstruction of Disputed Events", disputation den 24 april 2012. Jag arbetade vid ICCs rättegångsdivision vid den tidpunkt som Lubanga överfördes till domstolen (2006). Han var den första misstänkte som överfördes till domstolen. Då förberedde vi en s.k. benchbook, en översikt över rättegångsprocessen för domarna.

Rättegången har blivit betydligt mer komplicerad än vad som var förväntat och nödvändigt. I förhållande till liknande rättegångar borde målet vara enkelt och bevisfrågorna kan mycket förenklat delas upp i två delar: 1) Har UPC rekryterat och använt barnsoldater? 2) Är Lubanga ansvarig för detta?

Det har blivit mer komplicerat.  2008, innan själva rättegången ens börjat hotade rättegångskammarens domare att avbryta hela rättegången och släppa Lubanga eftersom åklagaren vidtagit åtgärder som förhindrat försvaret från att ta del av alla dokument som åklagaren samlat in i målet. Efter avbrott i förhandlingarna kunde åklagaren tillgängligöra en del av dokumenten och processen återupptogs. Jag anser att det var bra att domarna satte ner foten gentemot åklagaren när de upprätthöll den misstänktes rättigheter. Problemen har dock inte upphört. Åklagarens första vittne, en barnsoldat, ändrade sin historia i rättegångens inledning och återtog sina uppgifter att han varit på ett militärt träningsläger vilket var ett allvarligt hack i åklagarens ansträngningar.

Det som var ett enkelt mål har helt enkelt blivit mer komplicerat och jag vågar inte ge en prognos över utfallet i detta mål. Alldeles oavsett är det en historisk dag. Om åklagaren lyckas övertyga domstolen har allvarliga brott lett till ansvar, en förbrytare måste sona sina brott och brottsoffren kan få upprättelse. Om Lubanga frias så är det naturligtvis ett stort nederlag för åklagaren i hans första och enda avslutade rättegång då han (Luis-Moreno Ocampo) i år lämnar sitt uppdrag. Samtidigt skulle en friande dom visa att ICC ställer höga krav för en fällande dom och upprätthåller rättssäkerheten vilket på längre sikt är viktigt för domstolens legitimitet.

Tyvärr kommer domslutet inte att kommenteras i min avhandling då all korrekturläsning är gjord och tryckprocessen påbörjats. Jag får kommentera domslutet muntligt i samband med min disputation och få med domslutet i en eventuell andra, nedkortad och mer tillgänglig version av min avhandling.

För media som vill bevaka händelsen: här finns praktisk information.

Fakta om ICC
ICC skapades den första juli 2002 och dess säte är i Haag. Domstolen ska ej förväxlas med Internationella domstolen (ICJ) eller internationella krigsförbrytartribunalen för f.d. Jugoslavien (ICTY), samtliga med sitt säte i Haag. ICC skiljer sig från de tillfälliga och geografiskt avgränsade FN-tribunalerna för f.d. Jugoslavien (ICTY) och Rwanda (ICTR) genom att ICC i) är permanent och ii) har potential att pröva mål gällande folkmord, krigsförbrytelser och brott mot mänskligheten från hela världen.

Några andra pågående utredningar och/eller rättegångar vid ICC rör Kony m.fl. (Uganda), Bemba (Centralafrikanska republiken), al-Bashir (Darfur), Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi och Senussi (Libyen) och Kenyatta m.fl. (Kenya).

Chefsåklagaren Ocampos efterträdare heter Fatou Bensouda och hon tillräder i juni 2012. Bensouda är den som på daglig basis har företrätt åklagarkontoret i Lubangamålet.

Uppdatering: Domstolen fann Lubanga skyldig. Flera vittnesmål bedöms som otillförlitliga pågrund av hur åklagarens bedrivit sin förundersökning men det fanns tillräcklig övrig bevisning för en fällande dom. Detta är en framgång för internationell rättvisa.

ICC meddelar sin första dom den 14 mars 2012

Igår kom beskedet att Internationella brottmålsdomstolen (ICC) meddelar sin första dom den 14 mars 2012, en dag före min avhandling ska till tryck, tack för den! Det finns ingen möjlighet att få in det i texten, får ta det muntligt på disputationen den 24 april 2012.

ICC Judges reject immunity of sitting heads of state

Following the failure of the Republic of Malawi to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir the Pre-Trial Chamber stated the following in para. 36:

the Chamber finds that the principle in international law is that immunity of either former or sitting Heads of State can not be invoked to oppose a prosecution by an international court. This is equally applicable to former or sitting Heads of States not Parties to the Statute whenever the Court may exercise jurisdiction. In this particular case, the Chamber notes that it is exercising jurisdiction following a referral by the United Nations Security Council made under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, in accordance with article 13(b) of the Statute.

This is probably the most unequivocal statement that the ICC Judges have expressed on the matter of immunity of heads of state.