torsdag, november 26, 2015

Hur kan Sverige få andra stater att skydda flyktingar och skyddsbehövande?

En fråga som dykt upp i förhållande till EUs och Sveriges mottagande av flyktingar och skyddsbehövande är hur kan Sverige få andra stater att leva upp till sina internationella förpliktelser att skydda flyktingar och skyddsbehövande? Det korta svaret: det är svårt.

Nu kommer det långa svaret. Motåtgärder och stramare svensk politik kommer inte leda till resultat. Det enda som möjligtvis kan ändras andra staters politik är genom inhemsk opinionsbildning och lagföring i respektive land. Jag har resonerat om detta i min bok "Power and Law in International Society", Routledge 2015.

När funkar ömsesidighet och motåtgärder?
Motåtgärder kan funka inom andra områden av folkrätten, t.ex. internationell våldsanvändning, diplomatiska förbindelser, handel och likabehandling av varandras medborgare genom principen om ömsesidighet (på engelska "reciprocity"). På sidorna 18-19 redogör jag för detta.

In the absence of a central authority with preponderant power, rules of international law to a large extent are upheld by measures of self-help, including the threat and use of force, by individual states. Obedience to law is the result from the interest a state perceives in reciprocal action by another state or states. Reciprocity entails agreement between states to coordinate policy around international law standards to advance mutual interests, sometimes involving exchanges of reciprocal concessions on different issues. Reciprocity refers to “exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad.” It may be practiced both in relation to cooperation and defection. The risk that another state will exit the agreement rather than tolerate cheating can deter a would-be violator from cashing in on the short-term benefits of defection if that actor values future interactions. 
To illustrate the principle of reciprocity, imagine the establishment of a regime on the admission of foreign nationals. Under the rules of the regime, all states will grant residence status to nationals of other regime states. If regime state A disobeys the rules, other states of the same regime could reciprocate and refuse to grant residence to nationals of state A. The reciprocal connection may induce all parties to comply with the rules of the regime.
Ömsesidighet och motåtgärder fungerar ej beträffande mänskliga rättigheter och inom asylrätten
Motåtgärder  för att förmå andra stater att respektera mänskliga rättigheter  är inte tillåtet enligt folkrätten eftersom mänskliga rättigheter är en förpliktelse riktad mot individer och i någon bemärkelse "världssamfundet", inte mot andra stater. Men låt oss för tillfället bortse från frågan om det är tillåtet, är motåtgärder effektiva som metod för att förmå andra stater att respektera mänskliga rättigheter? På sidorna 25 och 97-99 förklarar jag varför motåtgärder inte funkar beträffande mänskliga rättigheter (samma resonemang håller för asylrätten).
reciprocity is often understood as a relationship between two states - “tit for tat” as a means of influence. However, some norms are of an erga omnes nature. The violation of such norms is not only an offence against the individual state affected and/or the individual person directly offended, it is also a violation against all members of the world community. Examples of erga omnes norms include aggression, piracy, genocide, slavery, torture, and racial discrimination. In such cases, reciprocity may arguably only give a limited explanation. As such, coercion, persuasion and socialization appear more relevant in relation to erga omnes obligations.

The mechanisms of creation and enforcement of international human rights treaties differs from other areas of international law. Notably the mechanism of reciprocity is less frequently used, if at all. If a state wishes to make another state violating human rights comply with the agreed obligations, it would make no sense and have no effect if the first state would reciprocate by making the same violations against its own population. The violation by a state of the rights of its own inhabitants does not ordinarily infringe on the national interests of other parties to the agreement, so there is no apparently compelling interest to scrutinize the violating behavior and call it to account. The most potent means of enforcement -military intervention and economic sanctions - are rarely used to enforce human rights norms because there is little incentive for individual states to take on such a burden. However, reciprocity may under certain circumstances operate if there is a policy of linkage, for example access to economic aid. In cases of human rights violations, aid can be revoked. Considering that mechanisms of reciprocity and coercion appear less effective in the field of human rights, other mechanisms may be more relevant. Processes of persuasion and acculturation (socialization) may better explain why states give expressive reasons for complying with human rights law, to obtain legitimacy through creating and ratifying human rights treaties.  
Simmons explains that international relations scholars often are pessimistic about the ability of international law to influence human rights practices because they look in the wrong direction. The traditional interstate perspective with criteria such as international law-making, adjudication and enforcement indicates that it is a weak legal system. ... The course of events that affect human rights occurs within the state, which is why local politics is important in this field. ... Most empirical studies on international human rights reach a similar conclusion; that the effectiveness of international law is mediated by domestic institutions and domestic actors. International human rights law largely depends on mechanisms of norm diffusion, and the effect of human rights treaties is typically indirect, depending on the domestic channels used in specific contexts.
Nu tror jag inte regeringens åtstraming egentligen handlar om att förmå andra EU-stater att respektera asylrätten, det handlar om att sänka Sveriges åtagande/ansvar och det är som så det bör diskuteras.

lördag, november 21, 2015

I Nürnberg blev ondskan straffbar

Idag återges intervju som jag get till TT i dagstidningen Åbo Underrättelser under rubriken "I Nürnberg blev ondskan straffbar".