Kommentar i Kvällsposten

Jag ger kommentar om utlämning i Kvällsposten 17 augusti 2019, Gert-Inges misstänkta mördare kan ha lämnat landet.

Setting the record straight how detention and indictment works in Sweden – as illustrated by the Assange case

I have written the blog post "Setting the record straight how detention and indictment works in Sweden – as illustrated by the Assange case" on Völkerrechtsblog, 3 July 2019. You can also read it below. 

Setting the record straight how detention and indictment works in Sweden – as illustrated by the Assange case

In a recently published text, Nils Melzer, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Human Rights Chair, Geneva Academy and Professor of International Law at the University of Glasgow, felt “repulsion and disbelief”, starting off with stating that Assange “has never been charged with a sexual offence” in Sweden. If one’s understanding of criminal procedure is based only on English law or common law, this is a serious allegation, if you are arrested in the UK you have to be charged within 24 hours. This account implies that the Swedish authorities have decided to seek Assange’s detention and extradition to Sweden without giving the grounds for these actions.  It would suggest that Sweden is a lawless society.

However, if one accepts that different countries and legal systems may offer the same legal safeguards without necessarily using the same language (English), one will soon understand that Assange has received due notification for the grounds for which the Swedish authorities have sought his detention and extradition. I have previously explained this in response to questions posed by journalists from the UK, colleagues in UK, by legal practitioners as well as academics. Generally, there has not been much need to explain this since most understand that different countries use different terms. Considering that Nils Melzer has a senior position in academia and in the UN system, I feel the need to write this blog post in order to prevent any further misunderstandings in this regard. Sweden, as any country, has its flaws. However, it is still a country where the rule of law is strong. Assange has been given the reasons by Swedish authorities for the decisions seeking his detention and requesting his extradition.

First, we need to find a common ground on how to compare different legal systems since Melzer appears to analyse Swedish law (which is a civil law country) through a common law lens. Anita Frohlich has explained that when comparing different legal system one should take three steps: (1) state the problem in purely functional terms, without being influenced by one’s own legal system; (2) examine how the different legal systems resolve the legal problem; (3) compare and evaluate how the different systems deal with the problem. I have similarly argued – in a text not dealing with the Assange case – when comparing a procedural feature in different legal systems that this should not be done “on the basis of its formal designation, but rather on what real and potential situations it aims to solve” (Klamberg, 2013, p. 15).

Turning to the matter at hand, charging.

According to English law, if you have been arrested, the police can detain you in custody for a maximum of 24 hours before they must either charge you with the offence, release you under police bail to return at a later date for further questioning, or release you without charge. The police can keep you in custody for 96 hours (4 days). After that, further detention has to be reviewed by a judge.

Chapter 24, section 9 of the Swedish code of judicial procedure provides that “When a person is apprehended or arrested or when an order for arrest under Section 8, first paragraph is executed, he shall be informed of the offence for which he is suspected and the grounds for his arrest.”

If the police and prosecution want to keep the person detained for a period longer than 4 days, a request must be made to and reviewed by a court (see Chapter 24, section 13). Chapter 24, section 14 of the Swedish code of judicial procedure provides that “The person [the prosecutor] who requests the detention shall state the grounds upon which the request is based".

Thus, the legal safeguards in Sweden and UK appear almost identical. This is no coincidence. Many of these safeguards follow from the fact that both countries are parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. The only difference is the language, not the substance. While English law uses the term “charge”, Swedish law uses the phrase “offence for which he is suspected and the grounds for his arrest”.

The European Court of Human Rights has in its case law explained the following.

“63. The Court reiterates that under Article 5 § 2 of the Convention any person arrested must be told, in simple, non-technical language that he can understand, the essential legal and factual grounds for his arrest, so as to be able, if he sees fit, to apply to a court to challenge its lawfulness in accordance with Article 5 § 4. Whilst this information must be conveyed promptly, it need not be related in its entirety by the arresting officer at the very moment of the arrest. Whether the content and promptness of the information conveyed were sufficient is to be assessed in each case according to its special features. Moreover, when a person is arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime, Article 5 § 2 neither requires that the necessary information be given in a particular form, nor that it consists of a complete list of the charges held against the arrested person. Furthermore, when a person is arrested with a view to extradition, the information given may be even less complete. However, this information should be provided to the detained in an adequate manner, so that the person knows why he has been deprived of his liberty” (Nowak v. Ukraine, Application no. 60846/10, Judgment 31 March 2011, para. 63)

Thus, the important requirement is that Assange is informed of the grounds for the decision to detain him. The detention of Assange has been reviewed several times by Swedish courts. Each time the prosecutor has to give the detained and the courts reasons, including what crimes Assange is suspected of. This has been reviewed several times by courts at lower instance and, in addition, two times by the Supreme Court of Sweden (2 September 2010 and 11 May 2015): The request for extradition was reviewed by British courts, including the UK Supreme Court (20 May 2012). There is no uncertainty concerning the offences which Assange is suspected to have committed. He has been formally notified and the measures have been reviewed by courts at all levels.

Lastly, some words about the concept of “indictment”, it is a term used both in Swedish and English law. The indictment comes at the very end of the investigation in Sweden. When the investigation is completed, the suspect is formally notified and given a copy of the prosecutor’s case file (including the evidence). The accused is given the opportunity to add information or to ask the prosecutor to conduct further investigations. Once this is completed, the prosecution may issue the “institution of the prosecution” which is the indictment (in Swedish: stämningsansökan). If the accused is detained the idea is that the trial in court should start very soon, within, two weeks. This is done in the interest of the accused since he or she should be presumed to be innocent and since defendant has the right to an expeditious trial.

Chapter 45, section 14 (in Swedish, the provision has been updated, the translation to English is old, now with a two-week time limit) provides the following.

“If the defendant is under arrest or in detention, the main hearing shall be held within two weeks from the date of the institution of the prosecution”

The procedural framework for serving the indictment assumes that the detained person who is about to go to trial is in Sweden and in the custody of the police, not in another country or taking refuge in an embassy. That is why the Swedish prosecutor closed the case 19 May 2017. It was very difficult to take the procedural steps necessary before an indictment could be served.

The English courts have understood and accepted this. They understand that England is not the only country in the world offering due process and they understand that we (outside of the UK) do not need to transplant English terminology into our laws. On a personal note, I appreciate that the English judges did not adopt a British colonial and imperialist approach when evaluating the legal system of Sweden. On 2 November 2011, the English High Court Of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Divisional Court, wrote the following (para. 153):

“Although it is clear a decision has not been taken to charge him, that is because, under Swedish procedure, that decision is taken at a late stage with the trial following quickly thereafter. In England and Wales, a decision to charge is taken at a very early stage; there can be no doubt that if what Mr Assange had done had been done in England and Wales, he would have been charged and thus criminal proceedings would have been commenced. If the commencement of criminal proceedings were to be viewed as dependent on whether a person had been charged, it would be to look at Swedish procedure through the narrowest of common law eyes. Looking at it through cosmopolitan eyes on this basis, criminal proceedings have commenced against Mr Assange.”

Now, what is the correct description of the stage of proceedings against Assange in Sweden? Assange is still a suspect for alleged rape in Sweden and he has been formally notified of this. In contrast to how it was until 2017, there is not at present a decision authorising his arrest. On 3 June 2019 the Uppsala District Court decided that there is probable cause for the suspicion of rape, less serious incident, and that there is a risk that Julian Assange will “fail to appear or in some other way avoid participation in the investigation and the following proceedings”. However, the district court decided not to issue a decision order “[s]ince Julian Assange is serving a prison sentence the public prosecutor can proceed with the preliminary investigation by issuing a European Investigation Order.” Once the Swedish investigation is completed, the Swedish prosecutor may choose to seek Assange’s surrender to Sweden with the assistance of UK authorities, to issue the indictment and summons to appear in court in Sweden for trial.

There are several relevant objections that Assange can make in relation to requests for extradition from the USA and to some extent in relation to the request from Sweden, but the different terminology used in Swedish and English law is not one of them.

 

Mark Klamberg is a Research Fellow at the University of Oxford and Professor in International Law and Deputy Director of the Stockholm Center for International Law and Justice at Stockholm University.

 

Cite as: Mark Klamberg, “Setting the record straight how detention and indictment works in Sweden – as illustrated by the Assange case”, Völkerrechtsblog, 3 July 2019, doi: 10.17176/20190703-112608-0.

Interview: Members of the UK parliament urge the extradition of Assange to Sweden

I contributed to BBC World Service (Radio) on the story "Members of the UK parliament urge the extradition of Assange to Sweden", listen at 12m30s.

Intervju: Åklagare kan återuppta våldtäktsutredningen mot Assange

Jag har medverkat i intervju i Metro "Åklagare kan återuppta våldtäktsutredningen mot Assange", 11 April 2019.

Intervju: Assange kan utlämnas till USA före Sverige

Jag har medverkat i intervju i SvD "Assange kan utlämnas till USA före Sverige", 11 April 2019

Intervju i Le Monde

Le Monde har intervjuat mig på temat "Julian Assange va être entendu par la justice suédoise".

Kan bli svårt få hem trippelmördaren

Jag kommentar i tidningen Bohuslänningen om trippelmördare som håller sig undan i Libanon, "Kan bli svårt få hem trippelmördaren".

Will Swedish prosecutors question Assange in London?

I have been interviewed in the Local (Sweden); "Will Swedish prosecutors question Assange in London?"

Sudans president kan stoppas

Idag blev jag intervjuad om Sydafrikas hantering av arresteringsordern mot Bashir under rubriken "Sudans president kan stoppas".

Assange lawyers demand Swedish prosecution files or no London interview

Today I was interviewed by The Register on the topic “Assange lawyers demand Swedish prosecution files or no London interview”.

Därför nekas Edward Snowden asyl överallt

Den 3 juli 2013 medverkade jag i TV4 Nyhetsmorgon på temat "Därför nekas Edward Snowden asyl överallt". Se inslaget nedan.

Comments on the NSA Prism program and Verizon court ruling

The Guardian and the Washington Post have on Thursday disclosed two very interesting documents that reveal two separate, probably interrelated, surveillance programs run by the NSA. The first document is a court order that forces Verizon to hand over phone records of millions of US customers. The second document contains selected slides from a slide PowerPoint presentation on a previously undisclosed program called PRISM. I have commented upon the story in Sveriges Radio P1 Studio Ett.

Update Sunday, June 9th, 2013. If one listens to the interview with me from Friday at 04.38-6.10, you can hear that I find the information about Verizon reliable because it confirms what has been revealed before from other sources (see for example USA Today May 10th, 2006). The documents disclosed by the Guardian strengthens this story. I am more cautious in the interview in relation to the claim that the NSA through the PRISM program has direct access to the servers of internet service providers such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Skype because the documents (i.e. the PowerPoint presentation) is scant on the scope and mode of these operations.

It appears as I am not the only one who is cautious in relation to the original PRISM story. Ed Bott writes that the same day (Friday June 7th 2013) Washington Post changed key details in the PRISM story. After comparing the original and the edited versions of the Post's article, Bott's conclusion is that the Washington Post "leaked PowerPoint presentation from a single anonymous source and leaped to conclusions without supporting evidence". Barton Gellman, who co-wrote the Washington Post’s story, later told the Huffington Post that he “started to hear some footsteps [from the Guardian], so I had to move” and said he "would have been happier to have had a day or two” more to work on the PRISM story. In other words, the story was published prematurely. Gellman co-authored on Saturday a new article based with a different narrative on how it works:

According to a more precise description contained in a classified NSA inspector general’s report, also obtained by The Post, PRISM allows "collection managers [to send] content tasking instructions directly to equipment installed at company-controlled locations," rather than directly to company servers. ... According to slides describing the mechanics of the system, PRISM works as follows: NSA employees engage the system by typing queries from their desks. For queries involving stored communications, the queries pass first through the FBI’s electronic communications surveillance unit, which reviews the search terms to ensure there are no U.S. citizens named as targets.

If this description is correct, the PRISM program is more targeted and narrow in scope compared to how it was described initially.

This story is very similar to the debate we had 2008 in Sweden on surveillance run by the FRA (the Swedish national authority for Signals Intelligence). My conclusion is that intelligence agencies and the politicians that have insight and power over these programs need to be more transparent if they want to continue with programs they perceive as legitimate. Otherwise we are sure to see more future "scandals" in this area, even in cases when the operations are run in accordance with the law. A good start for Government (in the U.S., Sweden and elsewhere) would be to publicly publish on an annual basis the number of messages (content data) they intercept and how many records (metadata) they have in their databases.

Here is what I have written on the topic in English.

Update Monday, June 10th, 2013. Today I am interviewed by Sveriges Radio on Snowden and potential extradition to the U.S. from Hong Kong or Iceland.

Sequencing and the discretion of the Government in Extradition cases

In my previous post I described how the Swedish extradition procedure works and its sequence. I explained that prior to the evaluation and decision of the Government the law provides that 1) the Prosecutor-General shall deliver a statement of opinion on the matter and 2) the Supreme Court shall rule on the matter. I wrote that the Government is the final body to approve an extradition request and it may deny a request even if it has been approved by the Supreme Court, but I did not go into the question of the discretion of the Government when there is an extradition agreement. Glenn Greenwald cited parts of my post on the Guardian website on this matter.

The problem is that Greenwald earlier and later in the same text argues for a sequence that would put the Government before the Supreme Court. In essence he is arguing that the Government should have the first and the last say with the Supreme Court in the middle. That would make the Supreme Court redundant which is contrary to the sequence that is provided for in the Extradition Act which I have tried to describe. It may also violate the principle of separation of powers. To be more specific, Greenwald writes in his debate with David Allen Green the following.

One of the "myths" Green purported to debunk was that "Sweden should guarantee that there be no extradition to USA." Assange's lawyers, along with Ecuadorean officials, have repeatedly told Sweden and Britain that Assange would immediately travel to Stockholm to face these allegations if some type of satisfactory assurance against extradition to the US could be given. This is the paramount issue because it shows that it is not Assange and Ecuadorean officials – but rather the Swedish and British governments – who are preventing the sex assault allegations from being fairly and legally resolved as they should be.  

[...] 

Sweden, Ecuador and Assange's lawyers could negotiate a resolution that provides Assange with meaningful protections against his fear of extradition to the US while following standard procedure on extraditions. Swedish authorities could, for instance, publicly state that they view espionage charges for the "crime" of reporting on government secrets to be a "political crime" not subject to extradition, but still reserve the right to formally decide upon any extradition request if and when they receive one.

This means that the Government (who represents Sweden and is asked by Assange and Ecuador for guarantees/assurances) must interpret whether reporting government secrets is espionage and a political crime and as such a non-extraditable offence. Section 6 of the Swedish Extradition Act provides that "[e]xtradition may not be granted for a political offence." Section 18 of the same act provides that "The Supreme Court shall decide whether extradition may be lawfully granted in accordance with Sections 1 to 10 of this Act." It is also obvious from the case law that it is for the Supreme Court to decide whether an act is a political offence and whether this blocks extradition. By the way, espionage is considered to be a political crime according to well-settled practice (see part II, pp. 545-548 and 928 in Swedish Government Official Reports SOU 2011:71). The purpose of the sequence provided for in the Extradition Act is that it is for the Prosecutor-General and the Supreme Court to assess the merits of the case before the Government, not the reversed. Or is Greenwald arguing that the Swedish Supreme Court should give an advisory opinion in advance of a non-existing request? There is no legal basis for such advisory opinions. The reversed sequence of processing a (non-existing) extradition request that Assange, Ecuador and Greenwald is asking for would be in conflict with the Extradition Act and possibly even with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Swedish constitution. My reasoning is similar to professor Ove Bring who has been interviewed by Dagens Nyheter. Here is an extract.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Patino claimed that they [Ecuador] have tried to get guarantees from Sweden that Assange would not be extradited in case of a request from the US. According to Bring it would be completely unreasonable to give such guarantees.

- Who could give such guarantees? The Supreme Court can not predict its own decision. If such a request is asked for it must be processed pursuant to the established manner.

–Subsequently the Government may deny extradition even if the Supreme Court has said yes but the Government can not issue any guarantess at the current stage. That would mean that the Government bulldozes the judicial system and says that it is irrelevant. It does not work that way in a democracy (my translation).

I could stop at this point but I would like to add an additional reason why the Government can not grant an assurance for non-extradiction to the US. Pål Wrange has raised an important caveat in his blog, namely

even if the Government has leeway under national law, it is bound by international law. Both the Swedish and the UK Governments have extradition agreements with the US, and these agreements provide that extradition shall take place, if the legal requirements are met. Hence, the Government could not provide a guarantee, without potentially violating an international obligation.

This means that the discretion of the Government to deviate from the ruling of the Supreme Court is limited if an extradition treaty exists. Pål Wrange raised this issue several days ago with me and I explained the caveat to various people, for example last Thursday in this twitter exchange with professor Nick Tholhurst. Several people have on Twitter argued that this is only mine and Wrange's opinion, they claim that the Government has full discretion. Our conclusion finds support in part II p. 450 of the Swedish Government Official Reports SOU 2011:71, below I have translated the relevant section (please note the heading of section 10.2 - obligation to extradite).

10.2 Obligation to extradite
10.2.1 Present law and assumptions

The starting point in section 1 of the Extradiction Act is that extradition pursuant to the law may be granted. With the word "may" follows that, as mentioned earlier, a free and discretionary power for the Government. This means that even if the legal requirements are met the Government may under the current legal scheme deny extradition. The Government may however by the accession to treaties and agreements binding under international law in an actual case be under an obligation to extradite. The possibilities of the State to deny extradiction with reference to State Sovereignty or ordre public may place the State interest before extradition and give some discretion and thus give the Government freedom.

To summarize, if there is an extradition treaty the Government is bound by an international obligation to extradite and it is only for legally sound reasons that it may refuse. An extradition treaty limits in a considerable way the discretion of the Government to deviate from the ruling of the Supreme Court. Without an actual request it is difficult to legally asses the exact discretion and whether the Government can exercise such discretion.

Some may ask, why is this not in the section on the Government's website where there is an English summary of the Swedish legislation? It is impossible to give answers to all actual and future, hypothetical cases in a summary, much less if the author of the summary is the Government.

Finally, many have referred to me as a professor. My correct academic title is juris doctor (equal to Ph.D.) and my position at the university is lektor (similar to lecturer), read more here on academic titels in Sweden.

Interviews and media on the Assange case

I have been interviewed by the Russian Legal Information Agency (RAPSI) on the assange case, you can read the article here. The New Statesman has made a reference to my previous post and Opinio Juris has republished parts of it, many thanks! I have also given some answers to Australian Crikey.

Intervju i SR Studio Ett

Igår intervjuades jag i SR Studio Ett huruvida Assange kan utlämnas till USA för spioneri. Du kan läsa och lyssna här.

Extradition of Assange to the US via Sweden for espionage

Many journalists have contacted me on the issue whether Julian Assange can be extradited to the US via Sweden for espionage where he might face the death penalty. The short answer is: no. Below you will find the long answer.

How does procedure work if somebody is to extradited from Sweden? Pursuant to section 14 of the extradition of criminal offences act a "request for extradition shall be made in writing. It may be transmitted by telefax or, subject to agreement in the individual case, by other means. The request shall be made to the Ministry of Justice." The request shall according to section 15 of the same act be rejected immediately if there is a manifest reason why it should not be granted. Otherwise, the request is forwarded to the office of the Prosecutor-General who shall deliver a statement of opinion on the matter. In addition, if the person referred to in the request has not consented to being extradited, the case shall be tried by the Supreme Court. Section 20(1) provides that if the Supreme Court has considered that there is a legal obstacle to extradition the request may not be granted. Even if the Supreme court has found that there are no obstacles, the Government can refuse extradition. This is because section 1(1) provides that if certain conditions are fulfilled, a person "may" not "shall" be extradited. In other words, even if the Prosecutor-General and the Supreme Court finds that all conditions for extradition are fulfilled the Government may veto such extradition. It does not work in the reverse way, the Government can not grant extradition if the Supreme Court has found that any of the required conditions are lacking.

As I understand, Assange wants the Swedish Government to guarantee that it will not grant extradition to the US. The US has not made any request to the Sweden on this matter. In other words, Assange wants the Swedish Government to pledge to use its veto power in relation to a non-existing request and before the Prosecutor-General and the Supreme Court has evaluated this non-existing request. There is nothing in the extradition of criminal offences act that deals with this scenario, but it would depart from established practice. Cameron and et. al write in a general way about this in their book "International Criminal Law from a Swedish Perspective", Intersentia, 2011, p. 171.

Assange fears that he will be extradited to the US where he may be at danger of being for torture or receiving the death penalty. There are at least three obstacles that makes it difficult or even impossible to extradite Assange to the US.

First, Sweden (as the UK) is party to the European Convention of Human Rights. The convention has been incorporated in Swedish law which makes it directly applicable for all state agencies, courts and the Government. Following the Soering Case, Sweden (and the UK) are prohibited from extraditing a person who may face the death penalty. Subject to are obligations from European Convention of Human and the Convention against Torture there is also a prohibition from extraditing somebody where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture (which includes inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).

Second, pursuant to article 28(4) of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States "a person who has been surrendered pursuant to a European arrest warrant shall not be extradited to a third State without the consent of the competent authority of the Member State which surrendered the person. Such consent shall be given in accordance with the Conventions by which that Member State is bound, as well as with its domestic law." Cameron and et. al write the following on p. 191: "It can be noted here, in connection with the EAW proceedings in 2010 concerning 'Wikileaks' founder Julian Assange, that the principle of speciality means that Assange cannot be extradited or deported from Sweden, unless the UK grants its permission for this." This means that the present decision from British authorities, upheld by Supreme Court, to extradite Assange to Sweden for sexuually related crimes is not enough. If the US would request Sweden to extradite Assange the issue not only have to be approved by the Prosecutor-General, Supreme Court and Government in Sweden, it also has to go through the British legal system a second time (which took more than 500 days the first time). In other words, if the US wants Assange extradited from Sweden he will have the protection of both the Swedish and British legal systems. It would appear easier to have him extradited directly from the UK.

Third, the Swedish extradition agreements with the US does not allow extradition when the offence is purely military or if the offence is a political offence. See article 5(4)-(5) of Convention on extradition between the United States of America and Sweden, 24 October 1961. See also the supplementary convention from 14 March 1983. Cameron and et. al write the following on p. 177: "No definition is given in the Extradition Act of what offence constitute a political offence. In Swedish extradition law, as in many other countries' extradition laws, a distinction is made between absolute and relative political crimes. Absolute political crimes are those exclusively directed against the state... espionage is an absolute political crime according to the travaux préparatoires". One may add that in Swedish law, as opposed to English law, travaux préparatoires is as source of law.

As I understand Ecuador has granted Assange political asylum, i.e. Ecuador is arguing that the US is seeking Assange for a political offence (espionage). Moreover, they fear that Assange will be subject to the death penalty and/or torture. As explained above, extradition from Sweden would for several reasons not be granted in such a case.

It is theoretically possible that i) the US might charge Assange for an other (non-political) crime than espionage and that ii) the US would be willing to issue a guarantee that the death penalty will not be issued. The latter has happened before - see for example the aftermath of the Soering case. Could Sweden extradite Assange in such a case? The answer is yes provided that the UK also approves, but I have great difficulties to see what kind of non-political crime that would be. We can of course discuss all kind of theoretical cases which I do all the time with my students at the University. The question is if sovereign states such as the UK, Sweden and Ecuador should take action on such theoretical cases, regardless of their likelihood and basis in reality?

Update 1. Pål Wrange has written two excellent blog posts in Swedish on, inter alia, the “temporary surrender”-procedure in the Swedish-US extradition treaty which has caught some attention. Some argue that it can be used to circumvent all the requirements that I describe above. Wrange makes two conclusions that are notable. First, the "temporary surrender" procedure has to fulfil the same conditions as the regular surrender procedure. Second, the same "temporary surrender"-procedure exists in article 14 of the British-US extradition treaty.

Update 2. Above I write that Assange "will have the protection of both the Swedish and British legal systems" if there is a extradition request from the US. In the comments to this blog post there is a discussion whether this includes an additional judicial review in British courts. As I understand an additional decision  to extradite  a person to a third country (the US) following a surrender under the EAW is taken by the UK Home Secretary. There is nothing in UK law which explicitly state that this decision is subject to judicial review. Therefore I would like to adjust my statement above. It would have been more accurate to state that any extradition request from the US have to be approved by both the UK and Sweden. As explained above, the Swedish Supreme Court needs to approve such requests while the precise procedure in the UK is unknown for me.

Stormning av Ecuadors ambassad

Idag medverkade jag i TV4 nyhetsmorgon om Ecuadors förestående beslut huruvida Assange ska få diplomatisk asyl. Jag blev kontaktad igår och under natten framkom det att Storbritannien skickat ett brev där man hotade att storma Ecuadors ambassad. Nedan finner du intervjun samt några rader där jag utvecklar mina tankar.
 
Enligt flera olika medier så hotar Storbritannien att storma Ecuadors ambassad i London för att kunna hämta ut Julian Assange. Uppgifterna kommer först från Ecaudor som mottagit ett brev med detta budskap från Storbritannien. Enligt SvD bekräftar en talesman för brittiska UD att Storbritannien förbehåller sig rätten att storma Ecuadors ambassad för att hämta ut Assange. Enligt brittisk lag kan brittiska myndigheter med en veckas varsel ta sig in i lokalerna. Ambassaden kommer då inte längre att ha diplomatiskt skydd.

Diplomatisk immunitet och skydd från ambassader följer av Wienkonventionen om diplomatiska förbindelser. Den vilar på principen om ömsesidighet som innebär att den både den sändande staten (Ecuador) och  den mottagande staten (Storbritannien) kan efter eget behag säga upp de diplomatiska förbindelserna. Att säga upp de diplomatiska förbindelserna kan förvisso betraktas som en ovänlig handling men det finns på inga sätt en folkrättslig skyldighet att upprättahålla sådana förbindelser. I artikel 9 av nämnda konvention kan vi läsa följande.

Den mottagande staten äger när som helst och utan att redovisa skälen för sitt beslut underrätta den sändande staten om att beskningschefen eller medlem av beskickningens diplomatiska personal är persona non grata eller att annan beskickningsmedlem är icke önskvärd.

Innebär det att Storbritannien kan förklara Ecuadors diplomatiska personal för persona non garata och därefter storma ambassaden? I artikel 45 av samma konvention står följande.

Om de diplomatiska förbindelserna mellan två stater avbrytas eller om beskickning återkallas slutgiltigt eller tills vidare
a) åligger det den mottagande staten, även i händelse av väpnad konflikt, att respektera och skydda beskickningslokalerna jämte därtill hörande egendom och arkiv,
b) äger den sändande staten anförtro vården av beskickningslokalerna jämte därtill hörande egendom och arkiv åt tredje stat, som godtas av den mottagande staten,
c) äger den sändande staten anförtro tillvaratagandet av sina intressen och skyddet av sina medborgare åt tredje stat, som godtages av den mottagande staten.

Artikel 45 framstår som tydlig - även om de diplomatiska förbindelseran avbryts så är Ecuadors ambassadbyggnad skyddad. Det intressanta är att Storbritannien har en nationell lag från 1987 som ger den brittiska utrikesministern rätt att samtycka till att ge skydd åt en diplomatisk beskickning men också ger utrikesministern rätt att återkalla detta skydd. Det är på grundval av paragraf 1(3) i denna lag som Storbritannien anser sig ha rätt att återkalla skyddet för Ecuadors ambassad. Det är dock inte helt enkelt. En sådan tolkning kan strida mot Wienkonventionen men även mot andra bestämmelser i 1987 års lag. Enligt paragraf 1(4) i denna lag kan utrikesministern endast återkalla skyddet för en diplomatisk beskning om det är förenligt med folkrätten, vilket inluderar Wienkonventionen. Vidare finns det i den brittiska lagen en hänvisning till artikel 45 av Wienkonventionen. Den brittiska juristen Carl Gardner kommenterar saken på sin blogg.

Uppdatering. Efter att ha diskuterat saken med min kollega Pål Wrange så blir min slutsats att Storbritannien möjligen kan ha rätt att även återkalla skyddet för en ambassad om man ger den sändande staten skäligt rådrum att avveckla ambassaden. Även om återkallande av en ambassads skydd i vissa fall kan vara förenligt med folkrätten så kan det likväl vara en orimlig åtgärd i det nu aktuella fallet. Möjligheten att återkalla skyddet för en ambassad som ges i den brittiska lagstiftningen från 1987 tar sikte på situationer där någon inifrån en ambassad utför en terrorhandling eller liknande handling vilket inte är aktuellt nu. Se gärna nedanstående video som beskriver nedskjutningen 1984 av Yvonne Fletcher, en brittisk polis, där skottet kom inifrån den libyiska ambassaden i London. Lagstiftningen från 1987 var ett svar på nedskjutningen av Yvonne Fletcher.

En stormning vore olämplig eftersom Storbritannien riskerar att försätta sina egna diplomater och ambassader i en riskabel situation då andra stater i framtiden kan vidta motsvarande åtgärd. Se vad Storbritanniens fd ambassadör (2004-2008) till Ryssland säger i The Telegraph.

Här finns Storbritanniens brev tillgängligt. Läs även vad Roger O'Keefe skriver.

Diplomatisk asyl

Imorgon torsdag medverkar jag i TV4 nyhetsmorgon om Assange och diplomatisk asyl. Nedanstående länkar ger god bakgrund.

Docent Pål Wrange resonerar kring i) Får Ecuador skydda Assange? och ii) kan Storbritannien ingripa mot Ecuador? Professor Matthew Happold skriver om Asylfallet vid ICJ från 1950 och OAS-konventionen om diplomatisk asyl.

Artikel 12 i OAS-konventionen är intressant då den behandlar rätten för den asylsökande att lämna staten han/hon vistas i för att kunna färdas till den stat som beviljat asyl. OAS-konventionen gäller förvisso i Ecuador men inte i Storbritannien.

En sammanfattning av Wranges och Happolds analys: I asylfallet från 1950 förklarade ICJ att diplomatisk asyl finns inte i den allmänna folkrätten (se sid 15-16). Istället gäller artikel 41 i Wienkonventionen om diplomatiska förbindelser, som anger att en ambassad inte får bryta mot värdlandets (i detta fall Storbritanniens) lagar, vilket man gör då man skyddar en misstänkt brottsling. Ecuador bryter alltså mot folkrätten. Storbritannien har möjlighet att protestera och vidta motåtgärder, exempelvis genom att helt eller delvis avbryta de diplomatiska förbindelserna med Ecuador. Om sådana motåtgärder är politiskt lämpliga och motiverade är en annan fråga som jag överlåter till andra att bedöma.

Uppdatering. Pål Wrange kommenterar saken i SvD1 och SvD2.

The extradition of Assange and the rule of speciality

I wrote a post in December 2010 on the question whether Sweden could extradite or deport Assange to the USA for illegal espionage or similar crimes after the UK has extradited him to Sweden for a criminal investigation on rape. My answer at that time was that unless the UK issues a new decision specifically on espionage he cannot be extradited/deported to the USA pursuant to the principle of speciality (section 12(1) of the Extradition for Criminal Cases Act).

I have found some additional support for this in legal doctrine. Cameron and et. al write the following in their book "International Criminal Law from a Swedish Perspective", Intersentia, 2011, p. 191:

It can be noted here, in connection with the EAW proceedings in 2010 concerning "Wikileaks" founder Julian Assange, that the principle of speciality means that Assange cannot be extradited or deported from Sweden, unless the UK grants its permission for this.

I imagine that when the UK House of Lords in the near future delievers its decision on the matter, journalists will seek information on the Swedish law in this regard. I would recommend that you contact the authors of the abovementioned book.

Utlämning av Assange till USA via Sverige

De senaste dagarna har jag blivit uppringd av flera journalister som undrar om Assange efter att han överlämnats från Storbritannien till Sverige för våldtäkt kan lämnas vidare till USA för att ha läckt hemligstämplade dokument. Jag har kommit i kontakt med liknande frågeställningar i min undervisning på grundkursen i folkrätt, där vi bl.a. tar upp fallen USA v. Rauscher (1886) och USA v. Alvarez-Machain (2002). Båda fallen tar upp den sk specialitetsprincipen som anger att en person som utlämnats endast kan åtalas för det brott han blivit utlämnad för. En strikt tillämpning av denna doktrin innebär att om Storbritannien överlämnar Assange till Sverige för våldtäkt så kan han inte åtalas eller utlämnas för något annat brott.

Jag har hittills försökt hänvisa journalisterna vidare. Efter att ännu en journalist som ringt upp ger jag upp och ska nu försöka ta mig an denna fråga. I Regeringens proposition 2003/04:7 Lag om överlämnande från Sverige enligt en europeisk arresteringsorder står följande på sidan 61.

Specialitetsprincipen och skydd mot vidareöverlämnande

Inom utlämningsrätten skyddar den s.k. specialitetsprincipen den som har utlämnats från åtal eller straff för andra brott än de som omfattades av utlämningsbeslutet (se avsnitt 12.1). För att den som har utlämnats skall kunna åtalas eller straffas för sådana brott – som har begåtts före utlämningsbeslutet – krävs som regel ett medgivande från den utlämnande staten. Specialitetsprincipen och skyddet mot vidareutlämning samt undantag från dessa principer regleras i 12 och 12 a §§ utlämningslagen. Ett krav på medgivande eller samtycke från den andra staten återfinns också i rambeslutet, men enligt artikel 27 kan varje medlemsstat förklara att sådant medgivande inte krävs om den utfärdande medlemsstaten har lämnat motsvarande förklaring. I artikeln anges dessutom ett antal situationer, i huvudsak hämtade från 1957 och 1996 års utlämningskonventioner, där den verkställande medlemsstatens medgivande inte krävs för ytterligare åtal eller straff. På motsvarande sätt kan medlemsstaterna förklara att vidareöverlämnande till en annan medlemsstat får ske utan medgivande från den verkställande medlemsstaten (artikel 28). Vidareutlämning till en stat utanför EU förutsätter dock alltid medgivande från behörig myndighet i den stat från vilken personen har överlämnats.

Propositionen tar sikte på utlämning från Sverige till annan stat, medan fallet Assange handlar om utlämning från annan stat till Sverige. Ovan citerade passage kan ändå vara relevant då den kommenterar ett rambeslut från Europeiska Unionens Råd om en europeisk arresteringsorder och överlämnande mellan medlemsstaterna. Rambeslutet ligger till grund från både brittisk och svensk lagstiftning. I artikel 28 av rambeslutet kan vi läsa följande.

Artikel 28
Överlämnande eller efterföljande utlämning

1. Varje medlemsstat får anmäla till rådets generalsekretariat att, i medlemsstatens förbindelser med andra medlemsstater som har lämnat samma förklaring, samtycket till överlämnande av en person till en annan medlemsstat än den verkställande medlemsstaten enligt en europeisk arresteringsorder som har utfärdats för ett brott som har begåtts före överlämnandet skall anses ha avgivits, såvida inte den verkställande rättsliga myndigheten i ett enskilt fall uppger något annat i sitt beslut om överlämnande.

2. Under alla förhållanden får en person som har överlämnats till den utfärdande medlemsstaten enligt en europeisk arresteringsorder, utan samtycke av den verkställande medlemsstaten, överlämnas till en annan medlemsstat än den verkställande medlemsstaten enligt en europeisk
arresteringsorder som utfärdats före överlämnandet i följande fall:

a) Om den eftersökte har haft möjlighet att lämna territoriet i den medlemsstat som han eller hon överlämnats till men inte har gjort detta inom 45 dagar efter sitt slutliga frigivande eller har återvänt till det territoriet efter att ha lämnat det.

b) Om den eftersökte samtycker till att överlämnas till en annan medlemsstat än den verkställande medlemsstaten enligt en europeisk arresteringsorder. Samtycke skall lämnas inför de behöriga rättsliga myndigheterna i den utfärdande medlemsstaten och skall protokollföras i enlighet med denna stats nationella lagstiftning. Samtycket skall inhämtas så att det framgår att personen har gjort detta frivilligt och fullt medveten om följderna av detta. Den eftersökte skall i detta syfte ha rätt till juridiskt biträde.

c) Om den eftersökte inte utnyttjar specialitetsbestämmelsen enligt artikel 27.3 a, e, f och g.

3. Den verkställande rättsliga myndigheten skall ge sitt samtycke till överlämnande av den berörda personen till en annan medlemsstat enligt följande bestämmelser:

a) En framställan om samtycke skall överlämnas i enlighet med artikel 9 och åtföljas av de uppgifter som anges i artikel 8.1 och av en översättning enligt artikel 8.2.

b) Samtycke skall ges om det brott för vilket det begärs i sig skall medföra överlämnande enligt bestämmelserna i detta rambeslut.

c) Beslutet skall fattas senast 30 dagar efter det att framställningen har mottagits.

d) Samtycke skall vägras av de skäl som anges i artikel 3 och får i övrigt vägras endast av de skäl som anges i artikel 4.

I de situationer som anges i artikel 5 måste de garantier som föreskrivs i den artikeln ges av den utfärdande medlemsstaten.

4. Trots vad som sägs i punkt 1 skall en person som har överlämnats enligt en europeisk arresteringsorder inte utlämnas till ett tredje land utan samtycke av den behöriga myndigheten i den medlemsstat som har överlämnat personen. Samtycket skall lämnas i enlighet med de konventioner enligt vilka den medlemsstaten är bunden samt enligt den statens nationella lagstiftning.

På vanlig svenska, om Sverige ska utlämna Assange till USA krävs det ett godkännande från behörig myndighet i Storbritannien. Om USA vill ha Assange utlämnad skulle det kanske vara lättare att vända sig direkt till Storbritannien istället för att gå via Sverige.

För de journalister som vill veta mera rekommenderar jag kontakt med åklagare som arbetar med utlämningsärenden alternativt "Enheten för brottmålsärenden och internationellt rättsligt samarbete" (BIRS) på Justitiedepartementet

Uppdatering. Nu har SvD talat med överåklagare Nils Rekke som reder ut saken.

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